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1. Future orientation and its empiric study
Future orientation is a way human thinking manifests itself, where thoughts are filled with preconceptions, imagination
and expectations. A characteristic feature of future orientation in people is when, at a certain level of their development, they
become conscious of the differences and connections between the past, present and future. Future orientation is a necessary
requirement of a person’s general orientation and existence concerning events in their own environment, reasons, goals and
consequences of their own actions.
In order to measure the future orientation of people, Nova´ky, Hideg and Kappe´ter developed and tested a detailed survey
in the early 1990s [1]. The survey contained questions about what people thought about the future; what techniques they
used to limit their uncertainty and instability about the future; their future-oriented actions and their related hopes and
expectations. Analysing the answers we can observe whether future orientation and its component parts are present in
human thinking, how these components relate to each other, and what characterises the different social groups.
The empirical background of the article is based on the findings of two national surveys. The surveys are among the few
carried out by futurists for the purpose of discovering how laymen and different groups are viewing the future; to what
extent they think they can influence it andwhat future-shaping notions young people use in their interpretation of the future
[2–6]. A characteristic feature of our surveys was the future orientation and thinking of the target population in a country
that has undergone sweeping political and democratic changes. The study focuses on how the attitude to the future has
changed in Hungary in the span of the 10 years that have elapsed between the two surveys during a period of abundant
change.
The first national representative survey was carried out in 1995, within the ‘‘Future’’ block of the Omnibus ISSP’’ survey,
organized by the Hungarian Social Research Institute, TA´RKI. Data was collected for further research, with a representative
sample of 1000 persons [7]. We repeated the survey in 2006 with the same questions, yet again with TA´RKI’s ‘‘Omnibus’’
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survey. In 2006 the sample consisted of 1034 elements. Both samples were made with multilevel, proportionally stratified
probability sampling. The level of confidence was 95% in both cases.
During the 11 years that have elapsed between the two surveys, we have witnessed a period of historical change in
Hungary, the changing of the political system, both of which have seen how people’s attitude towards the future has
changed. In this study we present findings and related data of the survey conducted in 2006 and compare themwith results
of the earlier survey of 1995. TA´RKI did not use the same social group samples for the two surveys, therefore the comparison
is not 100% conclusive.
2. Findings on components of future orientation
2.1. Ways of thinking about the future
Wewere curious about how people perceived the future, howmuch they felt the future depended on them, if they trusted
in the future and whether they had fears about it.
We asked them to decide how true the following statements were:
 I do not care about the future.
 The future depends on me.
 I do not have much control over my destiny.
 I look into the future with trust.
 I am afraid of the future.
The scale of answers ranged from ‘‘Not true’’, ‘‘Rather not true’’ and ‘‘Partially true’’ to ‘‘Completely true’’ (see Table 1).
In 2006 we found that 12% of respondents regarded it ‘completely true’ that they did not care about the future, 28%
thought it to be partially true, making a total of 40% of respondents who did not care highly about the future. In contrast to
this 27% were certain about caring about the future, and 33% were to some degree interested in the future. Comparing this
with the results of 1995 we can see that the number of those who did not care at all, has halved by the year 2006, and those
who did not really care has dropped by 15%. In 2006 themajority (60%)were conscious about caring about the future to some
degree, while this ratio was only 41% in 1995.
In 2006, 22% of the respondents completely agreed with the statement that their own future depends on them, and 53%
thought that it was partially true. In 2006, a total of 75% thought that their own future depended on thementirely or partially,
while in 1995 this ratio was only 59%. In 2006, 72% of respondents trusted the future, while in 1995 only 65% did. The change
in the ratio of thosewhowere fearful of the future (totally or partly) gives rise to optimism: in 2006 it was only 37% fearful of
the future, compared to 56% in 1995.
Summing up the answers to the five questions we have an overview of the expansion of future-oriented or future-
shocked thinking. Future orientation can be assessed from the answers to the questions: do they care about the future, does
the future depend on them, can they influence their destiny, and consequently do they trust in the future. A person can be
regarded to have future shock, if he answered that he does not care about the future, the future does not depend on him and
he does not trust in the future, but fears it. In summary: according to the results of the survey in 2006 some 23–27% of the
respondents were deemed to be future-oriented, and 7–12% could be regarded as future-shocked. In comparison to the
survey of 1995, these ratios were 13–27% and 17–24%. Between 1995 and 2006 the ratio of future orientation increased
substantially by over 20%, while the ratio of future-shocked persons dropped by half, even though their number is still
around 10%.
In the 2006 survey, the groups of future-oriented respondents bore the following characteristic features: male, under the
age of 30, living in Central Hungary or in Eastern Hungary, with no regular income or with more than £500 monthly net
income, with a degree in higher education or still studying, self-employed or entrepreneur, people without children, or a
family of three or more living in one household. Characteristics of persons regarded to be future-shocked: seasonal workers
or females, older than 55, single, living in South-Hungarian agricultural areas, earning less than net £230 per month,
attended primary school only, unemployed (senior)managers (between 6% and 23%!) or having a large family of four ormore
children.
Table 1
Ways of thinking about the future in 1995 and in 2006 (in %).
Statements Not true Rather not true Partially true Completely true
1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006
Not caring about the future 19 27 22 33 33 28 24 12
The future depends on me 17 7 22 18 43 53 16 22
Cannot influence destiny 13 23 19 31 40 34 27 11
Look into the future with trust 16 9 19 19 38 46 27 26
Afraid of the future 23 34 19 20 32 28 24 9
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Despite some positive signs, the overall picture is still negative. The majority of respondents still feel uneasy and
ambiguous about the future. They do not care highly about the future, although they think that their future depends on them
aswell. They feel they can only partially trust or influence their destiny and sometimes fear the future. In contrast to the 1995
survey the generic difference is apparent in respect of the respondents’ relationshipwith the future, the firm group of future-
shocked persons has increased in numbers to include seasonal workers who were unable to stabilise their living conditions.
The self-employed and entrepreneurs, senior managers or above still think in extremities. The role of education has
strengthened: only those with higher education have an extraordinarily high or low future-oriented thinking; whereas in
1995 this dividing line was drawn at secondary school certificate level. Regarding the future orientation of Hungarians,
territorial differences can be connected more to regional factors than settlement types.
2.2. Techniques to reduce uncertainty of the future
In order to limit the uncertainty of future events we have indicated four possible and applicable techniques: (1) insurance
policy, (2) savings, (3) a will, and (4) lottery games (see Table 2).
In 2006, 59% of the respondents had some kind of insurance policy. Since 1995 voluntary pension funds and many other
types of insurance have appeared on the Hungarian market. Despite changes, the number of people holding some kind of
insurance has dropped by 11%. Another substantial change is that people living in the capital (Budapest) have fewer
insurance policies than the rural population, and there are marked regional differences. The situation has significantly
improvedwith regard to savings: in 2006, 41% of respondents were indicated as having some savings, while in 1995 this was
only 33% with a lower dispersion. Students and inactive persons (many pensioners) did not have savings in 1995, and by
2006 their numbers has increased to include vocational workers, families living five or more in one household, and those
raising four or more children. In 2006 only a few people were indicated as having a will, similar to 1995. The ratio of those
havingwritten a will in 1995was the lowest in the Southern Trans-Danubia region, while in 2006 it was lowest in the region
of East-Central Hungary. Inclination to play the lottery demonstrates how people relate to (blind) luck and/or favourable
incidence. The answers show that 29% trust in their luck, which is 12% less than 11 years ago. We do not think this is a
significant change, because many other kinds of gambling opportunities have been made available since.
The spread of techniques used to limit the uncertainty of the future did not increase between 1995 and 2006. There is a
small drop in the number of insurances, but savings have risen. At least 40–60% of the respondents did not apply any
technique to limit their uncertainty of the future, but there is a small minority which applies a wide range of techniques.
Using techniques is subject to income, and the strata of the population that applies no such techniques probably have low
incomes.
2.3. Actions for the future
Our questions concerning actions taken to improve the future were focusing on what the respondents were doing to
achieve a better and happier life in the next 10 years (see Table 3).
In 2006, 26% admitted that theywere not doing anything for the future, and 8% had not even thought about it. Thus 34% of
respondents had not made any conscious plans for the future in 2006, while this was only 13% in 1995. The numbers have
doubled in the past 11 years, and the ratio of persons consciously not acting for the future has risen by nearly 50%, from 23%
to 34%.
In 2006, 66% of the sample groups were doing something for the future. Their activities included: working, studying,
caring for their health and their family, searching for work, saving money, being entrepreneurs, building relationships,
praying, gambling, etc. If we do not count other activities, the first six actionsmentioned are similar in both surveys. The two
main differences are, firstly: themention of extrawork as an activity for the future has decreased from 25% to 15%; secondly:
Table 2
Applicable techniques in 1995 and in 2006 to limit uncertainty of the future (in %).
Techniques 1995 2006 Change since 1995
Insurance 66 59 89
Savings 33 41 124
Lottery 33 29 88
Will 3 3 100
Table 3
Acting for the future (in %).
Measure of activity for the future 1995 2006 Change since 1995
Doing something 77 66 86
Not doing anything 13 26 200
Not knowing whether doing something 10 8 80
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caring for their health has become more popular in 2006 than caring for the family, probably because the number of those
caring for their family has dropped by half since 1995. Analysing the data by social groups is apparent that thosewho are not
taking any action for the future are likely to be older people, singles or personswith a large family, thosewho have completed
only elementary school, who have a low average income, employed labourers, or those living in the Northern Plains. A person
willing to take action for the future bears the following characteristics: young, living in Central Trans-Danubia, with a
relatively high (monthly) income, with higher education or still studying, has never worked, has no children, or living five or
more in one household.
2.4. Expectations regarding the future
The questionnaire was also extended to include the likely change of financial status and expectations of happiness in the
next 10 years. Questions concerning financial status were extended to look at changes both at individual and family level,
among friends and the wider Hungarian population, in the coming 10 years. Questions regarding happiness referred to
personal and family life. The response options were improving, declining, not changing, shall not be alive (by then) or do not
know (see Table 4).
Finance related anticipation showed a positive picture in 2006: 48% expected financial improvement in their families and
39% of their own status, but only one-third expected this for their friends and other Hungarians. 19–24% thought that the
situation would not change (most of them referring to their own status), and 19–29% expected a decline (mostly at national
level). The majority expected to see an improvement in their family’s financial status (all other answers were negligible).
Regarding personal financial future, most of the respondents thought it would improve, however every fourth person
thought that it would not change. Respondents were ambiguous about the financial status of the country in 10 years time:
those who hoped in the improvement of Hungary’s financial status were represented at nearly the same ratio (33%) as those
who thought it would decline (29%).
In 2006, expectations concerning the future were much more optimistic than in 1995. The ratio of those who expected
improvement or stagnation has risen significantly, while the number of thosewho thought the financial statuswould decline
is limited to 6–17%. The number of those who did not know the answer to their future financial status has also dropped
indicating that people are more conscious of these issues.
Regarding personal financial status, students are most optimistic, including younger generations, those who have no
income or have a higher income, the unemployed or idle, who live together four in one household, who have no children and
are living in Northern Hungary. Most pessimistic are the seasonal workers, those who have four or more children, female,
who earn between £130 and £230 as net monthly income, who are inactive for other reasons, who live together two in one
household, and those living in the capital, Budapest. Persons most optimistic about improvement of the financial status of
their family include young people, students, persons with high monthly income, the childless, the intellectuals, or those
living in Central and Western Trans-Danubia or Northern Hungary. Persons anticipating a decline in the financial status of
their family is typical in the case of seasonal workers, those who have four or more children, who have a maximum £65 or
between £130 and £236 as net monthly income, the self-employed and entrepreneurs, those who have only attended
elementary school or are inactive for other reasons, and live in Southern Trans-Danubia.
Regarding the future financial status of friends, most optimistic were groupswith the highest income, students, and those
living in Central Trans-Danubia. Most pessimistic are those who are inactive for other reasons, seasonal workers, those
earning less than net £130 per month, and living in Southern Trans-Danubia.
Concerning the financial status of Hungary, persons with the highest monthly income, the young, the childless, those
living in Central Trans-Danubia or Northern Hungary were trustful about improvements, but seasonal workers, the self-
employed and entrepreneurs, or those who are inactive for other reasons, and who have less than £130 net monthly income
mostly expected a decline in Hungary’s financial status.
Expectations regarding personal happiness have definitely run high since 1995. 52% of respondents hoped they would be
happy in 10 years time, which is 37% higher than it was in 1995. The ratio of those who expected to be less happy within 10
years is the same as itwas earlier, 18% vs. 17%. Increasing personal happinesswas expectedmostly by the young, or by people
with no income or one higher than £330 net monthly, those with higher education, employees, the self-employed and
Table 4
Expectations regarding the future in 1995 and in 2006 (in %).
Expectations on Improving Declining Not changing Not be alive by
then
Do not know
1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006
Your financial status 31 39 20 21 17 24 12 4 20 12
Your family’s financial status 34 48 23 19 16 21 3 – 24 11
Your friend’s financial status 25 33 24 21 15 21 2 1 34 24
Financial status of Hungary 25 33 31 29 12 19 1 – 31 19
Your happiness 38 52 17 18 – – 13 6 32 24
Your family’s happiness 42 59 18 17 – – 2 1 38 23
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entrepreneurs, the childless, those who live together four or more in one household, and live in Western Trans-Danubia. A
low level of personal happiness is expected mostly by the middle-aged, who live in Southern Hungary, who have completed
only elementary school, seasonal workers and the unemployed, pensioners, who have low or average monthly income,
singles, and families with one, four or more children.
In 2006, 59% of respondents were trustful about increasing happiness in their family’s life, which is 41% higher compared
to the data of 1995. Nevertheless the ratio of those who think that their family’s happiness would diminish has not changed,
it is still around 18%. This includes the young, and those who havemore than £500 as netmonthly income, personswho only
have a secondary school certificate, students, thosewho live inWestern Trans-Danubia, and live together three or four in one
household. Those who have low or very high monthly income, or who have finished only elementary school, the seasonal
workers, the pensioners, those who have four or more children, and live in the Southern Trans-Danubia share the view that
the happiness of their family would reduce/diminish n the coming years.
In 2006, there was a 7% difference between the ratios of those trusting in their family’s happiness, including their own
future happiness. Individual happiness was less expected. This kind of manifestation of family-orientation has not changed
significantly since 1995. The relationship between financial status and happiness has declined: in 2006 people were most
likely to hope for happiness (33%) rather than an improvement of their financial status. Those who trusted in the
improvement of their family’s financial status has decreased by 23% as compared to those who hoped for the increasing
happiness of their family—these differences were only 23% and 24% in 1995. Expectation of personal future happiness has
increased by 8%, while this ratio regarding the family has not changed compared to 1995.
3. How typical social groups related to the future, in 2006
In order to make visible the varying attitudes of Hungarians to the future, we merged the answers from different
components of future orientation. This method also enables the observation of how each social group relates to the future,
and which social groups can be regarded as future-oriented or future-shocked. We made this comparison by giving equal
significance to all answers, i.e. by persons regarded to be future-oriented, those expecting improvements in the financial
status and their happiness, those who act for the future and who apply techniques to limit the uncertainty of the future. The
same method was applied to study future shock, by way of operating with the following answers: persons whose thoughts
reflect future shock, who expect decline in the future, who do not act consciously (or at all) for the future, andwho do not use
techniques to limit the uncertainty of the future. The result of this validation is that the young, those who have more than
£500monthly income, intellectuals, those who have higher education, students, self-employed and entrepreneurs, who live
together four in one household and who live in Central Trans-Danubia mostly have a future-oriented attitude. In contrast to
this, those who relate to the future with future shock are mostly seasonal workers, those who have attended only primary
school, who earn between £65 and £130 as monthly income, who have four or more children, who are inactive for other
reasons, and who live in Southern Trans-Danubia.
Unfortunately we cannot entirely compare the data of 2006 with those collected in 1995, due to the change in the social
groups who participated in the second survey. Despite this, we observed some substantial changes:
 In 1995 the possession of a certificate of secondary education played a determining role, while in 2006 this dividing line has
moved up to higher education diploma.
 In 1995 themost future-orientedwere thosewho had average or a highmonthly income, but in 2006 only thosewho had a
high monthly income were future-oriented.
 The number of seasonalworkers (or unemployed) has risen significantly between 1995 and 2006, and they form the core of
the future-shocked persons.
Based on the results of 2006, we have filtered the groups of the future-oriented, the future-shocked, and thosewho do not
have a positive attitude to the future.Wewere curious to knowwhat typical ways exist in people’s attitude to the future, and
how it is manifested. To explore this question, we made a cluster analysis, and we found four groups: ‘‘rational optimists’’,
‘‘commonly passive’’, ‘‘pessimistic parents’’ and persons ‘‘without hope’’.
The ‘‘rational optimists’’ constitute 38% of the sample group. They are convinced that they can influence their destiny,
they care for the future to a degree, and are confident about it. They do not fear the future, they strongly believe
that their own financial status and that of their family will improve within 10 years, or will not worsen. Only 50% of
these people were confident about the improvement of their friends’ or others people’s financial status. Despite this
they are the most optimistic, as they are confident about happiness for themselves and their family. The group of
optimists includes people with higher or secondary degree education, but also students and people who have
never worked before. Older people and pensioners are underrepresented in this group. There are more males than
females among the optimists. In comparison to other groups, they are better-off financially: most of them earn between
£230 and £500 average monthly, although only every second person from the group of persons with highest income
belong to this group. Possession of modern electronic equipment, e.g. a PC, Internet-access, cell-phone, a car,
dishwasher, microwave or hi-fi equipment, by members of this group are over-represented compared to others. They
care about their future rationally: they are more likely to have insurance policies than others and they have substantial
savings.
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The ‘‘commonly passive’’ make up 31% of the respondents. Their characteristic feature is that they do not care about the
future. Regarding their expectations they prefer stability and avoid changes in all areas of life, they do not believe in either
improvement or in decline. Most of them earn between £130 and £330monthly income, but a significant number belongs to
the highest income group. They are the second best equipped with household appliances and entertainment electronics. In
all other aspects they are average.
The group of ‘‘pessimistic parents’’ is formed by 20% of the respondents. They do not believe that the future depends on
them, and they do not trust in the future. They do not believe they can influence their destiny, although they care about the
future. This is mostly anxiety, because they are afraid of the years ahead. Their relation to the future is negative and
pessimistic in all aspects. They expect their financial status to worsen, they also anticipate a decline or stagnation in the
financial situation of others. They lag behind the average also in applying techniques to limit uncertainty of the future. The
averagemonthly income of most members in this group is between £65 and £500, with a large dispersion. They usually own
a house of high value, and they possess consumer durables rather than entertainment equipment. As to education level;most
of them have a vocational or secondary school certificate.
The group of persons ‘‘without hope’’ comprised 10% of the respondents. They relate negatively to the future in every
aspect, they do not trust nor care about it. They think they are unable to influence their destiny which is beyond their reach,
and they are very much afraid of the future. They expect all-round decline, but mostly for their family. Notably, this is the
only group where members expect the worsening of their family circumstances rather than their own. Members of this
group predominantly think that they would not be alive in the next 10 years, despite the fact that many of them were
relatively young. Most of these people did not receive any kind of (vocational) training, or finished only a vocational school.
The majority are single or live two in one household, and there are slightly more females than males among them. The
number of workers is relatively low among them, and seasonal workers or pensioners have higher ratio here than in other
groups. Those who dowork are probably labourers. Most of them receive between £130 and £330monthly income, and they
do not usually have either savings or an insurance policy. Their household is mostly poorly equipped.
The typical future-oriented or future-shocked person belongs either to the group of ‘‘rational optimists’’ or to the persons
‘‘without hope’’. The ultimate future-oriented person cares about the future, acts for the future, and is optimistic about the
future. A future-shocked person is typically not interested in, not acting for, and not expecting anything from the future. The
group of ‘‘pessimistic parents’’ also includes future-shocked members, and most people who belong to this group are at risk
of becoming future-shocked. The future does not exist for the ‘‘commonly passive’’ who make up one-third of the sample.
They do not care about the future, do not attempt to change their situation, and do not expect the future to bring any change
for them. This negative attitude to the future may be explained by the low numbers in Hungarian society who consciously
plan for their future. Characteristic features of the four groups illustrate that attitudes towards the future is determined not
only by personality, but also by other factors, such as education, financial andwealth status, work,marital status, and human
relationships. All this has an overall influence and mutual effect on society.
4. Changes in attitudes to the future between 1995 and 2006
Between 1995 and 2006 the thinking of Hungarians showed remarkable positive changes concerning the future. The
majority of Hungarians who consider the future do not always think positively or with foresight. In the course of the past 10
years it is the changes in how the majority view the future with less fear and their ability to influence it that is seen as
positive. It would seem that future-oriented thinking and positive expectations has not become widespread among
Hungarians. The reason behind this, according to our survey is that people are unaware of what they could be doing for their
future, if at all. Those who do think they are doing something for the future, do not make efforts to think beyond their own
and their family’s future.
It is awelcome development that civic techniques (e.g. private insurance policies, savings, acquiringwealth and property)
are being notably applied, which are designed to alleviate economic difficulties and risks, inherent inmarket economies. It is
a regrettable feature however that at least half of Hungarians are still unaware of these techniques, instead relying on luck or
other perchance happenings.
In the years following the political changes in the mid-1990s a fraction of the population still showed no interest in their
future, presumably on grounds of the socialist belief that the state would continue to provide for a better future. They were
under the impression that the new government to be elected to power would do its best for their citizens and for the
country’s future. During the past 10 years, the ratio of persons disregarding the future has fallen. A reason behind this could
be the dying out of old concepts and generations, but also the realisation of the need for personal responsibility in the light of
increased liberties and declining state provisions, brought about by the political changes. It is also a fact that these changes
did not bring an improvement in the life of many, who in turn are now living ‘from hand to mouth’. They do not see a scope
for any change or action for their future and therefore cannot see how their situation can either improve or worsen.
Themassive presence of persons regarded to be future-shocked can be observed inHungarian society. They are thosewho
lived in hopelessness and deprivation during the socialist era, who could neither adapt nor take advantage of the new
conditions after the political changes in the country. These people are mostly poorly educated, unemployed, seasonal
workers, pensioners or with low income.
It is regrettable that large families (with three or more children) did not demonstrate a favourable change in their future
orientation in the past decade. They are concerned about the future, but because they have little or no faith in their ability to
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influence it they are very pessimistic about its outcome. This is alarming because children growing up in such a family
environment will not obtain the intellectual, emotional and mental background necessary for them to become future-
oriented, responsible adults and active citizens.
The past decade since the political changes in Hungary had brought great differentiation in future attitudes. Young or
middle age generations of the 1990s were capable of safekeeping (or acquiring) future-orientation, they are mostly well
educated, with higher than average income. Individual and family prosperity is in the focal point of their future orientation,
they have some degree of interest for the future of their community and country, but they do not consider doing (or are
willing to do) anything about it.
In summary, between 1995 and 2006, the attitude of Hungarians to the future has improved in some aspects while
becoming more unfavourable in others. It is a favourable development that thinking about the future has become more
widespread, future attitudes are more active and less frightening, expectations concerning the future have improved
considerably. However, worsening trends have also been observed in the handling of future uncertainty and risk
management. Future-oriented actions and concepts are very limited and a growing number of children are raised in families
fearing the future (or future-shocked). Given the fact that an increasingly wide strata of the Hungarian population is affected
by the unwelcome attitudes towards the future, society has become more vulnerable to imminent changes and challenges.
Based on the two sample surveys we can state that during the past decade Hungarian society has not yet learned to face
changes, or learned to think in a future-orientedway, or to elaborate life strategies that work towards an acceptable, tenable
future. Considering that schooling in itself strengthens future-orientation and related thinking, it is therefore recommended
to encourage and expand the teaching to deal a lot with the future, to strengthen future orientation and respect of future
studies, in order to accelerate related social learning processes in Hungary.
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